

Secret

Camp de Phalerum.  
11 May 1827.

My dear Lord

I have just received your letter as I was on the point of writing to you. I should exceedingly desire to have a conference with you & if you were to come in here on your way, you would do me a great services, for it is absolutely necessary that some combined plan should be adopted at this moment -otherwise we shall not only lose the Phalerum, but also the troops in it perhaps, and be too late to transport them elsewhere – for something must be done to assist the people in the Moria, and without means of any sort, I do not see how that is to be accomplished. If we can't pay the troops in the Phalerum, they will either leave the position or perhaps do worse. My own opinion would be to take away the troops from here and go with the fleet, if it was possible, & seize the positions of Cape Linguetta & Valona, by which means we should be able to revolutionize all Albania and completely distract the attention of Kiutahi, if not destroy him. When we were once established there, the fleet would be at liberty, & if you thought fit then to pass round to the gulf of Salonica or Negroponte much might be done \_ but in fact if the Government does not take steps to raise money I must disperse the army, as I see no chance of keeping it together. The French Commander has opened a communication with the Seraskier, and he goes to day to his camp to confer with him. I have written to Col. Fabvier the enclosed letter - it is probable that Kiutahi will demand the evacuation of the Phalire - What is your opinion if he does so? Keeping always in your mind our inability to keep it, for want of means to pay the men and provisions. In fact, no organization of the army can take place, unless I am able to withdraw from immediate operations and collect round me a certain number of officers & men anxious for regularity and discipline and some means to pay them, otherwise we should only go on from one disaster to another - for with the irregularity of the men- the want of provisions and ammunition and the unruly & naturally disobedient [1] conduct of the chiefs, nothing favorable can result from our operations. You were a witness, my dear Lord of the successful effort to relieve Athens; you were present to see that the main body of the army in the camp of the Phalerum (notwithstanding repeated orders to attack) remained tranquil spectators of our destruction in that battle, we are daily becoming weaker here – for today I must send away the Peloponnesian chiefs and their men, the latter to the number of 800 or 900 and two of the best generals of the army, Nikitas and Young Colocotronis, besides General P. Notara who goes immediately to Corinth. By the information I have received from Capt. Le Blanc of the frigate Junon, it appears that the Seraskier has already received the following reinforcements, 1,200 cavalry from Negroponte & 3000 Albanians. These troops arrived before the Battle of Athens, which was evident enough from the Enemy's great force in Cavalry the day of the action.

In fact, if the Government will not take steps for raising money, it will be impossible to go on - the army must break up and disperse - and that forthwith, for it cannot be kept together.

I am, my dear Lord.  
Yours ever sincerely.  
R. Church

to His Excellency  
Adm. Lord Cochrane  
&c. &c. &c.